Anti-Trust - Bank Mergers by Wolf, Henry C.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 2 Article 7
Anti-Trust - Bank Mergers
Henry C. Wolf
Copyright c 1964 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Henry C. Wolf, Anti-Trust - Bank Mergers, 5 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 280 (1964),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss2/7
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:280
ANTI-TRUST
Bank Mergers
The United States sued to enjoin a proposed merger of the
Philadelphia National Bank and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange
Bank, Philadelphia's second and third largest banks. As required
by the Bank Merger Act (as amended 1960) 1 the Comptroller
of Currency had approved the merger, despite reports of the
Attorney General, the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation that
the merger would have substantial anti-competitive effects.
The suit charged that the proposed merger was in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act2 and section 7 of the Clayton
Act.3 The injunction was denied by the District Court which
held that "section 7 of the Clayton Act was inapplicable to bank
mergers because banks are not corporations subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission;... and that since the
merger did not violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, a fortiori
it did not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act." 4 The case upon
appeal went to the Supreme Court of the United States under
174 Star. 129 (1960). The Bank Merger Act of 1960 amended the amend-
ment of 1950, 64 Star. 892, section 18, subsection (c) to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. The 1960 amendment provided that the Comp-
troller of Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, whichever
agency is required to make the approval of a particular merger or con-
solidation "shall take into consideration the effect of the transaction
on competition including any tendency toward monopoly," and shall
acquire an advisory report of the Attorney General and the other two
banking agencies on the competitive factors involved, "and shall not
approve the transaction unless after considering such factors, it finds
the transaction to be in the public interest."
226 Star. 209 (1890). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant
portion that 'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states, or with a foreign, is hereby declared to be illegal."
364 Stat. 1125 (1950), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). Section 7 provides
that "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital,
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce in any section of the country,
where the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
4 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 335.
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the Expediting Act.5 In a magnificent exhibition of hair-splitting
the Court reversed the decision of the District Court, but only
on the basis of quite unforseen reasoning.
In 1950 the Cellar-Kefauver Anti-Merger Act was passed
amending the ineffective section 7 of the Clayton Act. The
Clayton Act as passed in 1914 had disregarded mergers which
might be accomplished by asset acquisition, and referred only
to stock acquisition mergers.6 The Court reasoned that by this
amendment "Congress intended to close the loopholes in the
original section by extending its scope to the entire range of
corporate amalgamations from pure stock acquisitions to pure
asset acquisitions, and that it did not intend to exclude bank
mergers." 7
The Court rejected the appellee's contention that the Bank
Merger Act of 1960 superseded section 7 of the Clayton Act,
reasoning that the regulatory method provided for by the Bank
Merger Act was not so comprehensive as to make the anti-trust
law and its competive policy inapplicable, and that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction could not properly be applied here.8 The
Court rationalized that Congress in drafting the Act provided
for consideration of competitive conditions by banking agencies
before approving mergers, but that Congress did not intend to
confer a special dispensation upon the banking industry by ex-
cluding its mergers from the purview of the federal anti-trust
laws.9 The Court stated that "It is settled law that 'immunity
from anti-trust law is not lightly implied." 10
Having decided that section 7 of the Clayton Act applied,
the Court decided to test whether the effect of the merger would
be to substantially lessen competition. Here the recently ad-
vocated process of extensive market analysis as found in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States" and in the Federal Trade Commission
5 15 U.S.C. 29 (1958). "In every civil action brought in any District Court
of the United States under any of the said Acts, wherein the United
States is the complainant, an appeal will lie-only in the Supreme
Court."
6 Supra note 4, at 337.
7 Supra note 4, at 321.
s Supra note 4, at 352 and 353.
9 Supra note 4, at 350. See also California v. Federal Power Commission,
369 U.S. 482.
1o Supra note 4, at 348.
"t Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294.
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opinion in The Matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,12 was supplanted
by the highly subjective reasoning found in Standard Oil Com-
pany v. United States.'3
The Court was now prepared to deal with the issue con-
cerning the area of the market: whether the relevant market was
the Philadelphia area or whether ic extended to the large loan
markets dominated by the New York Banks. The Philadelphia
area was found to be the relevant market on the grounds that
the merger if permitted would result in an undue lessening of
competition in this market and that the benefit or harm resulting
in other markets was "a value choice of such magnitude as to be
beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence." 14 The Court
concluded that: "A merger which produces a firm controlling
an undue percentage of the relevant market, and results in a sig-
nificant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is
so inherently likely ra lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive ef-
fects." 15
Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented, stating that everyone
including the banking industry, the Congress, and the bar had
assumed that the Clayton Act as amended in 1950 did not apply
to bank mergers, and by the enactment of remedial kgislation,
the Bank Merger Act of 1960, Congress emphatically7 rejected the
remedy brought to life by the Court.16
In a separate memorandum, Mr. Justice Goldbe'g stated that
he concurred in the dissent, that section 7 of the Clayton Act
had no application to bank mergers, but that in his opinion there
was a "substantial Sherman Act issue." 17 But the Court did not
consider the issue of the Sherman Act. Perhaps had the Court
applied the Sherman Act's rule of reason it could have retained its
12 The Matter of Pillsbury Mills, FTC Dkt. 6000, 50 F.T.C. 555, (1953).
18Supra note 4, at 362. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
(1948). Here the Court decided that the contract violated section 7
of the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition simply be-
cause a substantial amount of commerce was affected.
14 Supra note 4, at 371.
15 Supra note 4, at 363.
l6Supra note 4, at 384.
7Supra note 4, at 395.
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judicial control over such cases, and the same time-by holding
that section 7 of the Clayton Act was superseded by the Bank
Merger Act-avoided what will be the subject of considerable
debate in the future.
H. C. W.
